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NEGATIVE PHILOSOPHY / REVERSE PLAN ADVOCACY

Failures of past FTAs, like NAFTA, mean we should stop doing any more FTAs

Dr. Robert Scott 2013. (PhD economics) No Jobs from Trade Pacts The Trans-Pacific Partnership Could Be Much Worse than the Over-Hyped Korea Deal 18 July 2013 <http://www.epi.org/publication/trade-pacts-korus-trans-pacific-partnership/>

-There was also a big gap between predictions and outcomes for the North American Free Trade Agreement enacted in 1994: NAFTA was supposed to create 200,000 new jobs through increased exports to Mexico but, by 2010, growing trade deficits with Mexico had eliminated 682,900 U.S. jobs, with job losses in every U.S. state and congressional district.  
-Given the big gaps between promised and actual outcomes, the United States should stop negotiating trade deals and fix the ones we have.

INHERENCY

Status Quo policy: US & Turkey are already working on a Free Trade Agreement

Selen Akses 2013. (Researcher at the Economic Development Foundation in Istanbul ) Oct 2013 <http://www.europeaninstitute.org/October-2013/turkey-does-not-want-to-be-left-out-from-the-us-eu-trade-talks-1011.html>

Turkey has taken initiative to launch its own separate agreement with the United States. There have been talks between Ankara and Washington on the subject. Vice President Joe Biden announced in May that President Obama and Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan had agreed on working toward a separate free trade agreement between the US and Turkey. Perhaps it is too late for a triangular agreement between Turkey, the US, and the EU, but another bilateral agreement could be an alternative solution to the problem.

SOLVENCY

Foreign trade in general and FTAs cannot drive economic growth: They raise both imports and exports, which offset each other, resulting in no net benefit

Dr. Paul Krugman 2010. (PhD economics; Professor of Economics and International Affairs at the [Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Woodrow_Wilson_School_of_Public_and_International_Affairs) at [Princeton University](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Princeton_University)) “Trade Does Not Equal Jobs“ <http://krugman.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/12/06/trade-does-not-equal-jobs/>

One thing I’m hearing, now that all hope of useful fiscal policy is gone, is the idea that trade can be a driver of recovery — that stuff like the South Korea trade agreement can serve as a form of macro policy. Um, no. Our macro problem is insufficient spending on U.S.-produced goods and services; this spending is defined by   
Y = C + I + G + X – M   
where C is consumer spending, I investment spending, G government purchases of goods and services, X is exports, and M is imports. Trade agreements raise X — but they also lead to higher M. On average, they’re a wash.

Turkey has little ability now to influence events in the Middle East and even undermines US foreign policy with Iran

Foreign Policy Project of the Bipartisan Policy Center 2013. (co-chaired by Ambassadors Morton I. Abramowitz and Eric S. Edelman – both are former US ambassadors to Turkey; BPC Founded in 2007 by former Senate Majority Leaders Howard Baker, Tom Daschle, Bob Dole and George Mitchell, the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) is a non-profit organization that drives principled solutions through rigorous analysis, reasoned negotiation and respectful dialogue) October 2013 “From Rhetoric to Reality: Reframing U.S. Turkey Policy” <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/US%20Turkey%20Policy.pdf>

Turkey has been left with little political capital to expend on influencing events in the Middle East. After a period during which Ankara pursued the vision of “zero problems with neighbors,” it now has nothing but problems. It has called for the ouster of Syria’s Assad, refused to recognize the legitimacy of Egypt’s new military government, cut off diplomatic ties with Israel, angered Iran with its acceptance of a NATO radar installation and its support for Syrian rebels, quarreled with the Iraqi central government in Baghdad, angered key Gulf states over its support for Muslim Brotherhood movements throughout the region, and alienated Europe with unfounded accusations and conspiracy theories. In October, it shocked its NATO allies by announcing that it would procure a missile-defense system from a Chinese company that is under U.S. sanctions for its dealings with Iran.

Little benefit to stronger alliance with Turkey: Multiple issues block Turkey from being a strong and cooperative partner

Foreign Policy Project of the Bipartisan Policy Center 2013. (co-chaired by Ambassadors Morton I. Abramowitz and Eric S. Edelman – both are former US ambassadors to Turkey; BPC Founded in 2007 by former Senate Majority Leaders Howard Baker, Tom Daschle, Bob Dole and George Mitchell, the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) is a non-profit organization that drives principled solutions through rigorous analysis, reasoned negotiation and respectful dialogue) October 2013 “From Rhetoric to Reality: Reframing U.S. Turkey Policy” <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/US%20Turkey%20Policy.pdf>

Indeed, Turkey’s response to Syria forced a shift to sectarianism in the rest of Turkey’s foreign policy, an approach that has only further diminished its influence in the region. And, with three elections—local, presidential, and parliamentary—looming in the next 18 months, Turkey faces growing political unrest, including among minorities badly affected by the Syrian civil war, and a faltering economy at home. Yet, the government’s response to these challenges thus far does not inspire confidence; AKP officials have chosen authoritarianism and sectarianism over compromise and cooperation at almost every turn. In short, at precisely the time that the United States would most benefit from a strong and cooperative Turkey, Turkey’s ability to fill that role has diminished.

FTA’s don’t increase jobs. Claims of success with S. Korea are based on flawed estimates and ignoring key data

Dr. Robert Scott 2013. (PhD economics) No Jobs from Trade Pacts The Trans-Pacific Partnership Could Be Much Worse than the Over-Hyped Korea Deal 18 July 2013 <http://www.epi.org/publication/trade-pacts-korus-trans-pacific-partnership/>

This paper reviews recent data on trade with South Korea after the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) took effect, and on trade flows after other free trade agreements. It concludes:  
-Claims that trade deals increase exports and create jobs are based on flawed trade models, and on distorted and one-sided interpretations of the findings of those models.  
-The flaws in trade models are exemplified in the U.S. International Trade Commission’s estimate that KORUS would increase U.S. goods exports by roughly $10 billion to $11 billion after fully phased in. This estimate focused solely on the impact of tariff cuts on exports, leaving out the effect of changes in foreign direct investment, outsourcing, and all of the other outcomes from trade deals provisions that impact trade flows.

S. Korea FTA didn’t create the predicted jobs

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When the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement was completed in 2010, President Obama said that it would increase U.S. goods exports by “$10 billion to $11 billion,” supporting “70,000 American jobs from increased goods exports alone” (The White House 2010).[1](http://www.epi.org/publication/trade-pacts-korus-trans-pacific-partnership/#_note1) He based this claim on estimates from the U.S. International Trade Commission that tariff cuts alone in KORUS would stimulate U.S. exports to South Korea, supporting the president’s goals of doubling U.S. exports in five years, and adding 1 million new manufacturing jobs. Things are not turning out the way the president predicted. KORUS took effect March 15, 2012. In the year after the agreement took effect (April 2012 to March 2013), U.S. domestic exports to South Korea (of goods made in the United States) fell $3.5 billion, compared with the same period in the previous year, a decline of 8.3 percent. In the same 12-month period, imports from South Korea (which the administration consistently declines to discuss) increased $2.3 billion, an increase of 4.0 percent, and the bilateral U.S. trade deficit with South Korea increased $5.8 billion, a whopping 39.8 percent.

Claims about FTA job growth happen by mistakenly ignoring imports and focusing only on exports

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The White House also seemingly cherry picked export numbers from the USITC study. The USITC report estimated that exports to South Korea would rise in the range of $9.7 billion to $10.9 billion, and Obama, as cited earlier, said KORUS would increase U.S. goods exports by “$10 billion to $11 billion.” But the administration ignored the projected impact of KORUS on imports, specifically, leaving out the USITC prediction that KORUS would increase imports in the range of $6.4 billion to $6.9 billion, producing an improvement of the bilateral trade balance ranging from $2.8 billion to $4.5 billion, not $10 billion to $11 billion as implied by Obama’s comment (U.S. International Trade Commission 2010, Table 2.1 at 2-9). The White House has refused to discuss the negative impacts of imports on the U.S. economy, and some officials at the Office of the United States Trade Representative have claimed before Congress that imports *benefit* the domestic economy—a highly suspect claim that will be addressed in a future EPI report. Evaluating trade deals by talking *only* about their impact on exports and ignoring imports is like trying to keep score in a baseball game by counting only runs scored by the home team. It engenders positive feelings but reveals nothing about how well a team is really doing. Talking only about trade deals and exports hides increased imports’ potential damaging effects on the national economy.

DISADVANTAGES

1. Lost jobs & economic growth.

US/S.Korea FTA reduced US exports and eliminated 40,000 good manufacturing jobs

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- The USITC also estimated that imports from Korea would increase by about $6 billion to $7 billion, and that the U.S. trade balance with South Korea would improve by about $4 billion to $5 billion. In the year after KORUS took effect, U.S. domestic exports to South Korea actually fell $3.5 billion. Projections for 2013 suggest no reversal of this trend.  
- The tendency to distort trade model results was evident in the Obama administration’s insistence that increasing exports under KORUS would support 70,000 U.S. jobs. The administration neglected to consider jobs lost from the increasing imports and a growing bilateral trade deficit. In the year after KORUS took effect, the U.S. trade deficit with South Korea increased by $5.8 billion, costing more than 40,000 U.S. jobs. Most of the 40,000 jobs lost were good jobs in manufacturing.

US/S. Korea FTA cost 40,000 US jobs and reduced US economic growth

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Using the president’s own formula relating changes in trade to jobs, the growth in the trade deficit with South Korea in the first year since KORUS took effect likely cost more than 40,000 U.S. jobs, most of them good jobs in the manufacturing sector because most traded goods are made by manufacturing industries. These losses are small when compared with the effects of the sequester, repeal of the payroll tax cuts, and other spending cuts that Congress allowed to take effect in 2013; these cuts have probably reduced GDP growth by about 1.5 percentage points this year (Bivens 2013a). But, taken together, austerity policies and the growing U.S. trade deficit with South Korea help explain why GDP and employment growth have slowed dramatically in 2013, and why manufacturing employment has declined steadily from a peak in February, falling through June 2013—a decline of 24,000 jobs in that period (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2013).

Historical analysis: FTAs kill jobs. For example, NAFTA eliminated over 682,000 US jobs

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For more than two decades, presidents of both parties have claimed that new trade deals would result in rising U.S. exports and new job creation. Bill Clinton (1993) and his supporters claimed in the early 1990s that the North American Free Trade Agreement would create 200,000 new jobs through increased exports to Mexico. In fact, by 2010, growing trade deficits with Mexico had eliminated 682,900 U.S. jobs, with job losses in every U.S. state and congressional district (Scott 2011).

Deeper Analysis: If the trade deficit goes up and we increase imports under an FTA, then we won’t gain jobs

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When it comes to trade, the issue is simple: Increased exports support U.S. jobs and increased imports cost U.S. jobs (Scott 2013c). Thus, it is trade balances—the net of exports and imports—that determine the number of jobs created or displaced by trade agreements. Unless trade agreements promise to reduce our too-high trade deficit, they will not have a net positive effect on U.S. employment. Rather than reducing trade deficits, past trade agreements have actually been followed by larger trade deficits. This is not some radical stance on trade—it is textbook economics.

2. Lower wages.

Increased trade with poorer countries means low-skill jobs get replaced by imports and unskilled workers in this country get lower wages. Most workers end up worse off

Dr. Josh Bivens 2013. (PhD economics) Using standard models to benchmark the costs of globalization for American workers without a college degree 22 Mar 2013 <http://www.epi.org/publication/standard-models-benchmark-costs-globalization/>

The integration of the rich U.S. economy and poorer global economies drives specialization that leads the U.S. economy to increase production in capital-intensive (both physical and human) industries and decrease production in labor-intensive industries. This increased specialization is the basis for overall national gains from trade, and is why trade is often described as “win-win.” But while traditional trade theory does indeed predict that overall national income rises due to specialization, it also predicts that even more income is redistributed *within* nations. For a country like the United States, the implication is that *most* workers are likely net losers from growing trade with poorer countries. The logic behind this trade-induced redistribution is simply that as the United States increases production (and increases exports) of capital-intensive goods and reduces production (and increases imports) of labor-intensive goods, this leads directly to a reduced demand for labor and increased demand for capital services. This in turn reduces wages while raising the returns to capital (both physical and human).

Deeper Analysis: Imports displace lower-skilled workers, who then must compete for the remaining jobs, driving down wages

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Importantly, the wage effects of global integration reach beyond those workers exposed directly to foreign competition. As imports displace non-college-educated workers from tradeable sectors (such as manufacturing), these laid-off workers need to accept lower wages to obtain work in other sectors (such as landscaping or construction). Further, the competition provided by these workers helps to lower the wages of similar workers *already employed* in these sectors. In short, while it is impossible to replace a waitress (a job in the non-tradable restaurant sector) with imports, her wages are harmed by having to compete with apparel workers who have lost jobs due to increased trade flows. It is also important to note that wages for most American workers may suffer even absent this reorganization of production, as the mere threat of direct foreign competition or of the relocation of part or all of a production facility can lead workers to grant wage concessions to their employers. This is often referred to as the “threat effect” of globalization. There is ample evidence that variation in wages is in large measure due to differing degrees of bargaining power in imperfectly competitive labor markets.

3. Long-term damage to US/Turkey relationship

Link: AFF promotes the theory that the US and Turkey are close allies and we can get closer with their plan

Link: Excess rhetoric about the US/Turkey relationship ignores real problems that need to be addressed and blocks genuine improvement in the relationship

Foreign Policy Project of the Bipartisan Policy Center 2013. (co-chaired by Ambassadors Morton I. Abramowitz and Eric S. Edelman – both are former US ambassadors to Turkey; BPC Founded in 2007 by former Senate Majority Leaders Howard Baker, Tom Daschle, Bob Dole and George Mitchell, the Bipartisan Policy Center (BPC) is a non-profit organization that drives principled solutions through rigorous analysis, reasoned negotiation and respectful dialogue) October 2013 “From Rhetoric to Reality: Reframing U.S. Turkey Policy” <http://bipartisanpolicy.org/sites/default/files/US%20Turkey%20Policy.pdf>

Yet, American policymakers have not, publicly at least, recognized this new set of challenges facing the U.S.- Turkish relationship. Washington, for the most part, continues to lavish Turkey with praise, despite mounting disagreements and concerns with Turkish policies. Even Ankara’s role in fanning the flames of extremism in Syria—one of America’s chief concerns there—has elicited relatively muted response from Washington. Focusing instead on admittedly close cooperation on terrorist threats elsewhere, Secretary of State John Kerry recently announced a U.S.- and Turkish-led fund to combat violent extremism, declaring, “Turkey has been and will continue to be a very valued partner in this effort.” The persistence of excessive U.S. rhetoric despite these concerns, and attention solely to other areas of partnership, is a testament to the importance Washington attaches to the relationship with Turkey. But it also serves to obscure the reality of a partnership that is underperforming and to hinder any attempts at improving it.

Impact: Turn the Affirmative’s advantages about the importance of US/Turkey relationship. Long-term, it gets worse if we vote AFF before we resolve the disagreements because it allows policy makers to paper over the differences instead of dealing with them honestly.

4. Lost Leverage For Human Rights

Link: AFF gives FTA to Turkey unconditionally. We don’t ask them to make any improvements in human rights first.

Link: US should require human rights improvement as a condition of Turkey trade negotiations

**Note: Just to be clear, the source quoted below advocates for Turkey to be involved in Free Trade Agreements, but at the same time they say we should put human rights conditions on the negotiations, which the Affirmative plan does not do.**

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Stand up for civil and economic freedom : Washington should speak out against the imprisonment and firing of journalists, the targeting of businesses belonging to opposition figures for arbitrary audits and investigations, and other means of muzzling dissent that are being employed in Turkey. Turkish progress in these areas should be tied to U.S. support for including Turkey in international trade negotiations.

Link: Setting conditions before a trade agreement (“ex ante conditionality”) can be an effective tool for reform (more effective than waiting until after)

Piotr Zalewski 2004. (journalist)Sticks, carrots and great expectations: Human rights conditionality and Turkey’s path towards membership of the European Union, Sept 2004 Center for International Relations <http://edoc.bibliothek.uni-halle.de/servlets/MCRFileNodeServlet/HALCoRe_derivate_00002977/Sticks,%20carrots%20and%20great%20expectations.pdf>

In order to gain an understanding of the role of human rights conditionality in the EU’s policy towards Turkey, we must first define it. In the broadest of terms, conditionality can be understood as an instrument, which entails “the linking, by a state or international organisation, of benefits desired by another state to the fulfilment of certain conditions.” Conditionality, by its very nature, involves a relationship between two (or more) unequal partners, the actor and the recipient: the first elaborates particular conditions whilst the second is charged with meeting them. Taking the lead from Fierro, we can identify two pairs of conditionality types. Ex post conditionality, the most commonly encountered manifestation of conditionality, refers to a situation where conditions appear once the parties have concluded a treaty, agreement or any other contractual relationship. A typical example is the so-called ‘human rights clause’ found in the body of most trade-and-cooperation agreements concluded by the EU/EC with third countries. When specified as an essential part of an agreement – which has been standard practice since 1995 – the clause provides the requisite legal grounds for one party to suspend the agreement on the basis of [systematic] human rights violations by the other. Ex ante conditionality, on the other hand, is present where certain conditions or criteria, usually found in documents which bear the hallmark of soft law, are meant to be fulfilled before an agreement is concluded – this usually renders the conditions themselves more political than legal. Though less widespread than ex post conditionality, ex ante conditionality oftentimes proves the more effective of the two: a case-in-point, to be discussed in this paper, is the Copenhagen criteria for accession to the European Union.

Impact: Turkey has numerous human rights problems

International Service for Human Rights 2014. (Swiss non-profit human rights advocacy organization) “The Situation of Human Rights Defenders in Turkey“ 16 June 2014 <http://www.ishr.ch/sites/default/files/article/files/turkey_-_upr_briefing_paper.pdf> (brackets added)

At its first Universal Periodic Review (UPR) of May 2010, Turkey accepted only 10 out of 20 recommendations concerning freedom of expression, association and peaceful assembly. However, it accepted both recommendations concerning human rights defenders (HRDs) promising to ‘investigate all complaints of harassment and persecution against human rights defenders and NGOs, and sanction those responsible’ and ‘consider inviting the United Nations Special Rapporteur for Human Rights Defenders to visit the country ’. Nevertheless, four years later, HRDs [human rights defenders] and journalists still complain of continued judicial harassment and growing repressions on protesters and civil society as well as failure in holding perpetrators accountable. 1. Risks facing human rights defenders  
•The most commonly cited obstacle to human rights defenders and journalists is the limitation of freedom of expression. In the last report on Freedom of Press 2014, Freedom House lowered the ranking of Turkey from ‘Partially Free’ to ‘Not Free’ due to the fact that ‘constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and expression are only partially upheld in practice, undermined by restrictive provisions in the criminal code and the Anti-Terrorism Act.’  
•CPJ [Committee to Protect Journalists] reported that ‘Turkish authorities held 40 journalists behind bars, making it the world's leading jailer of journalists (...). With recent releases in Turkey, Turkey now holds 21 journalists in jail.’  
•Other risks concern the right to peaceful assembly, excessive force by police, and impunity. According to Amnesty, Turkey continues ‘its policies of violence, repression and censorship in the face of the people presenting their demands for human rights in a peaceful and democratic way’.

SOURCE INDICTMENTS

USITC (U.S. International Trade Commission) studies flawed

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There are a number of problems with the way the USITC studies the effects of such multifaceted agreements, and the way the USITC studies have been used by President Obama and his predecessors (similar USITC studies were done for most of the 17 other free trade agreements negotiated since NAFTA).  A USITC study done for China’s entry into the World Trade Organization (U.S. International Trade Commission 1999) contained spectacularly unrealistic forecasts of the impacts of that agreement. The fundamental problem with the USITC model referenced in the president’s support for KORUS is that it is designed to evaluate the effects of tariff changes on trade flows. The structure of this model reflects most economists’ view that tariff cuts are the most important policy changes in FTAs—hence the USITC’s use of its CGE model as its lamppost to forecast the most important “economic effects” of these deals. Tariff-based trade models are the economic equivalent of a lamppost highlighting the ground far from where an inebriated man actually lost his wallet—they shine light on the relationship between tariffs and trade, but they cannot be used to predict the impacts of FTAs on offshoring, on foreign and domestic investment in factories making products for export to the United State and other countries, on other factors affecting trade, investment, and wages that are unrelated to tariff changes.